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A Survey of Arbitral Forums: Their Significance
and Procedure
I. Introduction
There are essentially three means of redressing grievances where
transnational disputes must be resolved: litigation, arbitration and dip-
lomatic protection.' These three forms may, in turn, be divided into liti-
gation in the host, home or a third country; ad hoc or institutional arbi-
tration in the host, home or a third country; and diplomatic protection
based on informal discussion and diplomatic protests or, where provided
for in a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the states, recourse
to an international arbitral commission or an international legal forum. 2
Of the three dispute resolution mechanisms, diplomatic protection is
generally considered a last chance avenue of approach. Except for the
occasional informal discussions and good offices undertaken at the consu-
lar or embassy level, most countries would rather ignore the claims of
their citizens against nationals of other countries than permit them to
become possible sources of international tension. In short, diplomatic
protection is a discretionary function of the government and cannot be
relied on as a sure means of dispute settlement.
In choosing which of the two remaining forms is the best means of
resolving a dispute, the potential claimant should consider the following:
(1) which decisional forum is most accessible; (2) how much time and
money the claimant has to spend; (3) whether there will be opportunity
to compromise; (4) what kind of record the forum has in resolving dis-
putes; (5) whether the claimant will have an opportunity to air the merits
of his claimi and (6) whether there will be a reasonable probability of
enforcement. 3 Litigation, despite the likelihood of a final award, is gen-
erally less effective than arbitration when measured in terms of these
practical considerations. Moreover, forum non conveniens and general
problems of excessive case loads among local claimants make litigation in
a third country unattractive.
I S. LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GIEDT, R. HORTON, P. MATTHEWS,
& G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 150-66 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. LAZA-
RUS].
2 Id.
3 See generally Schmidt, Arbitration under the Auspices of the International Centerfor the Settlement
of Investment Duputes, Implications of the Decision onjurisdction of Alcoa Minerals ofjamaica, Inc. o.
Govenment ofjamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90 (1976).
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Based upon the foregoing, arbitration appears the better avenue of
approach, particularly if there is a desire to keep the contract alive. Ar-
bitration is a creature of the contract, from whence it derives its powers.
It can be tailored to suit the needs of the contract, large or small, on the
basis of the bargaining power of the contracting parties.4 Moreover, by
agreement of the contract, arbitral decisions are usually final and are not
automatically tied to a particular set of laws or conflict of laws rule.5
Other advantages offered by arbitration are privacy, neutrality and
relative expertise of the chosen forum. 6 Awards are generally not pub-
lished without the express consent of the parties; this practice obviously
avoids the glare of the media and open public conflict, thereby permit-
ting greater focus on dispute resolution by the forum. Most arbitral fo-
rums are also neutral in character and are usually speedier and less
expensive than litigation. Finally, the chosen arbitral forum may have
experts in the field of business, economics or engineering instead of law.
Their expertise may provide a more technical and perhaps effective reso-
lution to a dispute involving less than total abrogation of a treaty or
breach of contract.
The choice of arbitral forum is either ad hoc or institutional. With
regard to institutional forums the choice is quite diverse. This comment
will briefly discuss the better known institutional arbitral forums avail-
able for resolution of transnational disputes. Their history and signifi-
cance, the various rules for selecting the forum, and instructions on
where to obtain more information about the forums will be included in
the discussion. In addition, an overview of the UNCITRAL rules, which
arbitrators may choose to govern their proceedings, is offered.
II. American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) was founded in 1926
through the merger of two prior organizations, the Arbitration Society of
America and the Arbitration Foundation. 7 The AAA, like many other
arbitral forums, does not actually conduct arbitration hearings. Instead,
it is an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organization that su-
pervises independent arbitrators in all types of domestic and interna-
tional disputes under its Rules of Commercial Arbitration."
With well over 20,000 cases pending in any year, the AAA is by far
the world's largest arbitral institution.9 Traditionally, the vast majority
4 McClelland, International Arbitration. A Practical Guide to the System for the Litigation of
Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L. L. 729, 732-33 (1977).
5 Id at 738, 742.
6 Id. at 732.
7 S. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 23.
8 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1979)
[hereinafter cited as AAA RULES] For copies of the AAA Rules and further information write
to the American Arbitration Association, 140 West 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10020.
9 2 J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PROCESS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 120
(1979).
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of these cases involved only American parties.10 In the 1970s, however,
the AAA began to arbitrate an increasing number of cases involving in-
ternational contractual disputes. The AAA handled 104 international
cases between 1972 and 1975," and the number more than doubled to
233 cases between 1975 and 1978.12 These cases involved a wide variety
of commercial disputes between nationals of more than forty different
countries.13 Over fifty percent of the disputes involved contracts for the
sale of goods.' 4 The remainder of the cases-involved the transfer of in-
dustrial property and know-how, agency contracts, and formation or dis-
solution of transnational corporations. 15
Generally speaking, the amount of money at issue in these disputes
was relatively small; approximately fifty percent involved less than
$200,000.16 The relatively small amounts involved in the disputes may
have contributed to the speed with which the AAA resolved the claims.
One award was made in thirty days, and the average time period, from
the filing of a demand for arbitration until the granting of a final award,
was six months. 17 The longest case took 785 days, 18 about the same
length of time as an average case arbitrated under the ICC Rules of Con-
ciliation and Arbitration.19
International cases are administered by the AAA under the same
Commercial Arbitration Rules as cases involving only U.S. parties.20
These rules were carefully drafted in order to circumscribe the authority
of the arbitrator while at the same time granting the arbitrator sufficient
discretion to govern the arbitral proceeding effectively. 2 1
Pleading under the AAA Rules of Arbitration is quite simple. Arbi-
tration commences in one of two ways: submission 22 or demand.2 3 Sub-
mission occurs when, despite the absence of a prior agreement to
arbitrate, both parties to an existing dispute decide that they want the
AAA to arbitrate their case. The parties submit their case by drafting an
agreement to arbitrate under the AAA Rules and filing it in duplicate at
the nearest AAA Regional Office. 2 4 The agreement to arbitrate should
contain a statement of the matter in dispute, the amount of money in-
io Id
I I Holtzmann, United States Arbitration. the American 4rbitration Association, in HANDBOOK OF
INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 252 (1979).
12 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 124.
13 Compare Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 252 with 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 125-26.
14 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 124.
15 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 252.
16 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 125.
17 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 253.
18 Id.
19 Thompson, The Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, in HANDBOOK
OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (1977).
20 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 252.
21 McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 INT'L LAw. 211, 226 (1979).
22 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 9.
23 Id. § 7.
24 Id. § 9.
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volved and the remedy sought. 25
More commonly, AAA arbitration is initiated when a party who has
previously agreed to arbitrate files a "demand. '26 The demand is a very
simple document, normally only one or two sentences long.2 7 It need
only contain a reference to the general nature of the dispute, an estimate
of the amount of money at issue and a statement of the remedy sought.28
Arbitration formally begins once the party requesting arbitration files
two copies of the demand in an AAA Regional Office.2 9 No affidavits or
supporting documents are required other than two copies of the arbitra-
tion provision of the contract that is in dispute.30 It is vital, however,
that the arbitration clause in the contract is a valid and binding agree-
ment to arbitrate under the AAA Rules. To avoid any dispute as to the
parties' intentions, the AAA suggests that the following provision be in-
serted in all commercial contracts:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court hav-
ing jurisdiction thereof.3'
The party against whom a demand is filed has seven days to file an
answer.3 2 The answer is not required to be in any special form, but all
counterclaims must be affirmatively asserted in the same manner as the
demand.33 If the defendant fails to file an answer within seven days, it is
assumed that the claims made in the demand are denied.34 The arbitral
process is never delayed because the defendant fails to file an answer. 35
Immediately after a demand is filed, the process of selecting an arbi-
trator begins. If the parties have specified in their arbitral contract a
particular method for selecting and appointing an arbitrator, the AAA
will follow that method.3 6 Also, if the parties desire to have three arbi-
trators hear their case, they should so specify in the arbitration clause of
their contract. In the absence of a request for three arbitrators, the AAA
strongly favors use of a single arbitrator.3 7
If the parties fail to specify any method for appointing an arbitrator,
the AAA has an established selection procedure that gives the parties
maximum input into the choice of an arbitrator. The AAA maintains a
25 Id
26 Id § 7.
27 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 261.
28 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 7(a).
29 Id § 7(b).
3 Id.
31 Holtzmann, supra note 1I, at 256.
32 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 7(b).
33 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 261.
34 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 7(b).
35 Id
36 Id § 13.
37 Id. § 16.
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National Panel of Arbitrators with backgrounds in a variety of different
trades and professions.3 8 From this panel the AAA selects a number of
persons whose training and experience suggest an expertise in the area of
the parties' dispute.3 9 The AAA mails a list containing the names of
these persons, along with relatively detailed biographical information, to
each of the parties.40 The parties have seven days4 ' from the mailing of
the list to examine it, cross off any names objected to, number the re-
maining names in order of preference and return the list to the AAA.
42
The AAA then compares the lists. It eliminates any person that either
party has crossed off the list.4 3 Next it calculates the person with the
highest degree of preference by both parties and invites him or her to
serve as arbitrator. 4
4
In the event that no person on the list is acceptable to both parties,
the AAA will usually send another list, and the same procedure is re-
peated.45 If the parties are still unable to reach an agreement, or if one
party is acting in bad faith, the AAA has the authority to appoint an
arbitrator from its National Panel without sending further lists. 46 This
arbitrator must be neutral, 4 7 that is, independent of both parties, and in
no event will the arbitrator be a person whose name was previously
crossed off the list by either party.48 Furthermore, upon the request of
either party, the AAA will select an arbitrator who is a national of a
country other than that of the parties. 49
Once an arbitrator has been selected, certain procedural matters
must be resolved before the case can be heard on its merits. Generally,
parties will specify beforehand where arbitration is to take place and
what rules of laws will govern the proceedings. In the absence of such an
agreement, the AAA Rules provide that the AAA, rather than the arbi-
trator, determines the place of arbitration. 50 A weakness of the AAA
Rules, however, is that they make no mention of what substantive or
procedural law should be applied in the absence of an agreement be-
tween the parties. This is a crucial omission because the rights of the
parties under the contract vary radically according to the rules of law
that are applied. For example, the AAA Rules provide that a party's
ability to subpoena witnesses or obtain discovery of documents is depen-
38 Id § 5.
39 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 258.
40 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 12.
41 Because of delays in international mail delivery, this time period is ordinarily extended.
See Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 258-59.
42 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 12.
43 Holzmann, supra note 11, at 258.
44 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 12.
45 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 258.
46 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 12.
47 Id §§ 14, 18.
48 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 258.
49 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 15.
50 Id § 10.
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dent on whether such activity is "authorized by law." 5 1
Although the AAA Rules contain no reference to substantive or pro-
cedural rules, they are quite specific with regard to evidentiary matters.
The AAA Rules state that the arbitrator is the sole judge of what is rele-
vant and admissible at the arbitration hearing.52 The policy behind this
rule is that the so-called "legal rules of evidence" were intended for jury
trials and that an experienced arbitrator will not be unduly prejudiced
by irrelevant facts.53
The arbitration itself is a straightforward process under the AAA
Rules. The arbitrator begins the hearing by requesting each party to
make a brief oral statement clarifying the issues in the case. 54 Unlike the
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, the AAA
does not require the parties to submit "terms of reference" specifically
defining the issue in the case. 55 The AAA rejects the use of terms of
reference because the drafting of such terms needlessly duplicates the ar-
bitration process, delays resolution of the case and increases animosity
between the parties.56
After they have made their opening statements, the parties present
their evidence much as they would in a common law trial. Thus, the
AAA encourages parties to be represented by counsel and it permits a
party to be represented by attorneys from foreign countries, even if they
are not licensed to practice law in the forum state.5 7 All witnesses are
subject to cross-examination by both the arbitrator and the adverse
party.58 Furthermore, the arbitrator has the authority to inspect or in-
vestigate, on his own motion, any instrumentality connected with the
dispute.59 If he deems it necessary, the arbitrator may also issue
whatever orders are required to maintain the status quo or to safeguard
any property subject to the arbitration.60
When both parties have completed the presentation of their cases,
the AAA Rules require the arbitrator to ask them "whether they have
any further proofs to offer or witnesses to be heard. '6 1 If not, the hearing
is closed. From this moment the arbitrator has thirty days to reach a
51 Id § 30. It appears that many arbitrators apply the law of the local forum, at least for
procedural matters, in the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties. This is not a
particularly rational policy when the AAA, rather than the parties, selects the forum state.
Other arbitrators apply traditional conflicts of laws principles. See Holtzmann, supra note 11, at
256.
52 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 30.
53 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 263.
54 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 28.
55 See text accompanying notes 119-20 infia.
56 Ehrenhaft, Efective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191,
1205 (1977).
57 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 260. See generally S. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 92-124.
58 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 28.
59 Id § 32.
60Id § 33.
61 Id § 34.
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decision and render an award. 62 In the case of three arbitrators, the
AAA Rules provide that a majority may render a decision, 63 but the
thirty day time limit for granting the award cannot be extended. 64 Be-
cause the arbitrator has so little time in which to issue an award, there is
no requirement that the award be accompanied by a written opinion
and, in fact, the vast majority of AAA awards contain no such opin-
ions. 6 5 All awards issued on the merits are final and cannot be appealed
absent corruption, fraud or abuse of discretion.66 The courts will not go
behind the award to determine whether the arbitrator made errors either
of fact or law.6 7
At present, the major drawback of AAA international arbitration is
that it is dominated by American parties. U.S. parties filed over seventy-
five percent of all demands for arbitration between 1975 and 1978,68 and
only a handful of demands were filed involving disputes in which neither
party was an American. 69 The predominance of U.S. parties in the AAA
apparently creates a feeling among some foreign businessmen that the
AAA is biased against them. Latin Americans appear to be particularly
suspicious of AAA arbitration, thus making it more difficult for U.S. bus-
inessmen to secure agreements to arbitrate in the AAA. 70
Those U.S. businessmen who can convince their business partners to
accept AAA arbitration, however, will find that it is an excellent arbitral
forum. It is particularly attractive to small and medium-sized business-
men because its services are very reasonably priced. AAA arbitrators
serve without pay 7' except in protracted cases, 7 2 where the parties often
agree to compensate the arbitrator for the time he spends on the case.
Thus the only cost a party incurs other than attorney and expert witness
fees 7 3 is the standard AAA administrative fee. This fee is quite modest in
comparison to other forums. 74 For example, the administrative fee on a
$200,000 dispute is $1,850. 7 5 All fees in cases involving $5,000,000 or
more are privately negotiated with the AAA, but it is believed that the
fee in a relatively complex $5,000,000 case would be approximately
62 Id. § 40.
63 Id § 27.
- Id § 38.
65 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 267.
66 Id. at 266.
67 Id.
68 2 J. WETrTER, supra note 9, at 126.
69 Holtzmann, supra note 11, at 252-53.
70 Despite wide-ranging U.S. business interests in the nations of Central and South
America, very few disputes involving nationals of these countries are arbitrated by the AAA. 2
J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 125-26.
71 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 50.
72 Id The parties usually pay the arbitrator if the arbitration hearing lasts more than two
days. The fees range between $100 and $500 per day. 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 129-30.
73 AAA RULES, supra note 8, § 49.
74 See text accompanying notes 115-17 infta.
75 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 129.
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$13,850.76
In the long run, however, the single most attractive feature of AAA
arbitration is the speed with which it resolves disputes. The AAA's aver-
age six month time period, from the start of arbitration to the granting of
a final award, compares favorably with any other international arbitral
forum. This factor, more than anything else, accounts for the increasing
number of cases the AAA arbitrates each year.
III. International Chamber of Commerce
The International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration was
created on July 24, 1922, to promote arbitration of all types of interna-
tional commercial disputes.7 7 The term "Court of Arbitration" is some-
thing of a misnomer because the court is not an arbitral body and does
not actually arbitrate cases. Instead it is an administrative council
within the general framework of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC).78 The Court of Arbitration issues Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration 79 and supervises the application of these rules by the
arbitrators. The arbitrator or arbitrators, as the case may be, are selected
by the parties to the dispute.8 0 The Court of Arbitration only appoints
arbitrators if the parties themselves fail to appoint or are unable to agree
upon an arbitrator.8 1
The ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration are widely used in
the settlement of international commercial disputes. Between July 1972
and July 1975, 458 disputes from seventy-four countries were submitted
to the court for arbitration.82 The cases involved a wide variety of legal
questions. Over fifty percent of the disputes involved breaches of con-
tracts for the sale of goods or the supply of industrial services such as
engineering and mechanical drawing.8 3 The remainder of the cases sub-
mitted for arbitration involved breaches of agency contracts, disputes
concerning the transfer of industrial property and licensing of secret
know-how, and agreements to form or dissolve partnerships or corpora-
tions whose principals were of different nationalities.8 4 It should be
noted, however, that very few maritime disputes are submitted to the
ICC for arbitration.8 5
76 Id
77 Thompson, supra note 19, at 19.
78 Sacerdoti, The New Arbilraton Rules ofICCand UNCITRAL, I I J. WORLD TRADE L. 248,
250 (1977).
79 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION (1975)
[hereinafter cited as ICC RULES]. For copies of the ICC RULES and further information write
to the International Chamber of Commerce, 1212 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y.
10036.
80 Id art. 2.
81 Id
82 Thompson, supra note 19, at 19.
83 Id at 20.
84 Id
85 Id.
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The ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration allow the parties to
elect two forms of dispute resolution: conciliation and arbitration. Con-
ciliation is an optional proceeding.8 6 The parties may request concilia-
tion even if they have previously agreed to arbitrate or they may by-pass
it altogether. If the parties elect conciliation, they may later request ar-
bitration without prejudice to their case.8 7 Parties desiring to resolve
their dispute through conciliation should petition the Secretary General
of the ICC.88 The petition should contain a statement of the case and be
accompanied by documents relevant to the dispute.89 The Secretary
General then notifies the President of the ICC who appoints a "Concilia-
tion Committee" composed of three members of the ICC Court of Arbi-
tration.90 To the extent possible, one of the conciliators will be of the
petitioner's nationality and the other of the respondent's nationality.9 1
The third conciliator serves as chairman and is of a nationality other
than either the petitioner or the respondent. 92
The Conciliation Committee meets, examines the documents, hears
testimony, and suggests a settlement.9 3 This is a quick and inexpensive
procedure if the parties agree to the proposed settlement. The parties,
however, are not required to accept the proposed settlement and, if the
matter goes to arbitration, no member of the Conciliation Committee
may sit as an arbitrator.94
A party wishing to have recourse to arbitration must file a petition
stating the facts of his case and the existence of a valid agreement to
arbitrate under the ICC Rules. To avoid any question as to whether the
parties intended to arbitrate, the ICC recommends the inclusion of the
following provision in all commercial contracts: "All disputes arising in
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the
said Rules. ' '95
After a valid petition for arbitration is filed, the respondent has
thirty days to file an answer or a counterclaim. 96 The parties may elect
to have their dispute heard by either one or three arbitrators. 97 If the
parties elect to have one arbitrator, they must decide upon a mutually
acceptable person within thirty days or they lose all control over the
86 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, OP-
TIONAL CONCILIATION (1975), reprinted in 1 INT'L COM. ARB. (Oceana) pt. IV .A, 12 (1979).
87 Id arts. 1, 5.
88 Id art. 2.
89 Id
90 Id art. 1.
91 Id art. 1(2).
92 Id.
93 Id arts. 3-4.
94 Id art. 5.
95 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STANDARD ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE (1975).
96 ICC RULES, supra note 79, arts. 4-5.
97 Id art. 2(3)-(4).
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choice. 98 If the parties contract to have three arbitrators hear their case,
each party is entitled to select an arbitrator of his choice. 99 The third
arbitrator, who serves as chairman, can be selected by any process agreed
to by the parties. 100
In lieu of an agreement between the parties, the Court of Arbitra-
tion appoints an arbitrator. 1° 1 The ICC Rules favor a sole arbitrator
over a panel of three arbitrators; in the absence of a contrary agreement
between the parties, three arbitrators will only be appointed in excep-
tional circumstances. 102 Furthermore, neither party has any input into
the court's choice, and neither party can protest the court's selection un-
less it is shown that the arbitrator is not "independent"' 10 3 of both par-
ties.
Obviously, if the parties wish to choose their own arbitrator they
must do so in their contract prior to arbitration. It is not enough to agree
on the process for selecting an arbitrator because one party may subse-
quently refuse to follow this process. If this happens, the whole selection
procedure is removed from the control of the parties. Thus, the parties
should actually name an arbitrator in advance if they want to retain com-
plete control over the selection process.
Once an arbitrator has been selected by the parties or appointed by
the ICC Court of Arbitration, he decides on the "terms of reference"
upon which the parties will submit their case for arbitration. 10 4 The
"terms of reference" is a document designed to aid the arbitrator in de-
fining the issue presented in the case. In this document the parties must
specify the issue to be determined, the place of arbitration, and the pro-
cedural rules to be followed, including the substantive law to be applied
by the arbitrator. 105 Should the parties fail to reach an agreement on the
terms of reference, the ICC Rules grant the arbitrator sweeping author-
ity to proceed to arbitration by applying whatever rules he deems appro-
priate. 106
Once the terms of reference are agreed upon by the parties or stipu-
lated by the arbitrator, the case proceeds to arbitration. After hearing all
the evidence, the arbitrator grants a tentative award.'0 7 Although the
ICC Rules do not require a written opinion, most awards are accompa-
nied by a memorandum explaining the arbitrator's reasoning. 10 8 The
98 Id art. 2(3). See text accompanying notes 122-24 ihfra.
99 Id art. 2(4).
100 Id.
1l Id.
102 Id. art. 2(5).
103 The term "independent" is not defined in the ICC Rules. Some authorities suggest that
while an employee of a party would not be independent, the party's lawyer would be independ-
ent under ICC case law. See Sacerdoti, supra note 78, at 253.
104 ICC RULES, supra note 79, art. 13(1).
105 Id
106 Id arts. 11-13.
107 Id art. 21.
108 Thompson, supra note 19, at 28-29.
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tentative award is then sent to the Court of Arbitration for approval or
modification, but an arbitrator's award is rarely disturbed. 10 9 In the case
of three arbitrators, unanimity is not required. The rules provide for a
decision by a majority of the arbitrators and, where no majority can be
assembled, for a decision by the chairman of the arbitral panel. 10
After the arbitrator's tentative decision is approved by the Court of
Arbitration, the Secretariat of the court notifies the parties of the result,
at which time the award is deemed to be final.I' No appeal is permitted
from a final award." 2 Because no appeal on the merits is permitted,
publication of a final award is generally the conclusion of the ICC arbi-
tration process. Well over ninety percent of the parties who submit to
arbitration voluntarily comply with the arbitrator's award." 3 In those
few cases where voluntary compliance is not forthcoming, the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards ' 4 may be invoked to compel compliance.
Despite the fact that over ninety percent of all its final awards are
voluntarily complied with, parties who are considering submitting an is-
sue to the ICC for arbitration, or who are contemplating including a
provision in their contract providing for arbitration by the ICC, should
carefully consider alternative forums. No single arbitral forum is right
for every party and the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration have
a number of unattractive features. Generally speaking, ICC arbitration
is more costly, more time-consuming and, to a large extent, less predict-
able than arbitration in other forums.
First, the cost of ICC arbitration, like litigation in many courts, can
be prohibitive. Unlike some other arbitral forums, such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), which base costs on the amount of work
performed by the arbitrators, the ICC determines costs according to the
amount of money involved in the dispute.' 15 Thus, the larger the dollar
amount of the dispute, the higher the cost of arbitration. In addition, the
arbitrator's personal expenses, such as travel expenses and premiums to
arbitrator's with special expertise in highly technical matters, may sub-
stantially increase the cost of arbitration." 6 It is estimated that a single
arbitrator's fee could be as high as $62,000 in a dispute involving $5
million." 7 Moreover, this figure does not include costs a party incurs to
109 ICC RULES, supra note 79, art. 21.
110 Id art. 19.
111 Id art. 23.
112 Id art. 24.
113 Thompson, supra note 19, at 22.
'114 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. For the U.S. implementing legisla-
tion, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1976).
115 Young, Commercial Arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, II A.B.A.L.
NOTES 57, 61 (1975).
116 Thompson, supra note 19, at 22.
117 McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 225.
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prepare for arbitration such as retaining a lawyer to take depositions and
affidavits.
Second, the duration of ICC arbitral proceedings is longer than a
party might expect. One case, admittedly highly exceptional, continues
to move slowly after more than ten years of arbitration. 18 Even an aver-
age ICC case, however, requires almost two years to resolve.' 19 This time
period is substantially longer than that taken by other arbitral forums to
resolve similar cases. A major reason for this delay is the requirement
that parties agree to "terms of reference" before the case goes to arbitra-
tion. Drafting the terms of reference can be an expensive and time-con-
suming process that often degenerates into a mini-arbitration
proceeding. 120 Preparation of terms of reference needlessly duplicates
subsequent arbitration by encouraging the parties to introduce massive
documentary and testimonial evidence in order to have the case submit-
ted to the arbitrator on the most favorable possible ground.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the vagueness of the ICC
Rules promotes uncertainty in the arbitral process. Unlike other arbitral
forums, the ICC Court of Arbitration does not closely circumscribe the
authority of its arbitrators.' 2 1 Instead, the ICC Rules grant arbitrators
broad discretion to decide all questions not resolved by the parties in
advance of arbitration. The ICC Rules merely state that, in the absence
of a contrary agreement, the Court of Arbitration will determine the
place of arbitration, 2 2 that the arbitrator will determine substantive law
by applying accepted conflicts of laws principles,' 23 and that the arbitra-
tor may invoke whatever procedural rules he desires irrespective of the
municipal law where the arbitration occurs. 124
Because the ICC Rules are so vague, all possible points of conten-
tion regarding arbitral procedure should be resolved contractually before
a dispute actually arises. If the parties neglect to agree on such matters
in advance, and later find that they cannot agree on them in the midst of
a heated dispute, they will lose all control over the arbitral process.
Under the ICC Rules, decisions that could determine the outcome of the
entire arbitration are left to the sole discretion of the arbitrator. He
alone has absolute authority, subject only to judicial review for abuse of
discretion, to determine such questions as the extent of discovery, if any;
the right to present or cross-examine witnesses; which rules of evidence
will be applied; and the right to have a written transcript made of the
proceedings. ' 25
118 Thompson, supra note 19, at 22.
119 Id
120 McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 226.
121 Id at 225-26.
122 ICC RULES, supra note 79, art. 12.
123 Id art. 13.
124 Id art. 11.
125 McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 225.
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Despite the vagueness of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration,
the ICC Court of Arbitration is a good arbitral forum for certain types of
disputes. Sophisticated parties will specify in their arbitration clauses
where they want the arbitration to take place and what substantive and
procedural laws they want applied. The expense of ICC arbitration is
less likely to be a major concern for such parties because they are willing
to pay for the kind of expertise that ICC arbitrators can provide. How-
ever, less sophisticated parties, especially those whose disputes involve
smaller amounts of money, might be well advised to look to other arbi-
tral forums.
IV. Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (U.S.S.R.)
The Statute 26 of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry was approved by the
Supreme Soviet on April 16, 1975.127 That legislation restructured the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC), which had been func-
tioning since June 17, 1932. The new statute was designed to increase
the competence of the former FTAC in response to the intensive develop-
ment of Soviet international trade. Accordingly, the Commission is now
empowered to resolve "disputes which derive from contractual and other
civil law relations arising between subjects of law of various countries
when carrying out foreign trade and other international economic and
scientific-technical ties.' 128
The FTAC is not part of the state judicial or administrative system,
but is instead a non-governmental organization which offers arbitration
facilities on the basis of a voluntary submission by the disputants. ' 29 The
Commission has its offices at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry. 1 30 Supplementing the FTAC statute are the Rules of Procedure,
which were also revised effective August 1, 1975.131
Disputes referred to the FTAC are tried by persons who are listed as
arbitrators by the Presidium of the Chamber 32 for four years. 1 33 Ini-
126 USSR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, STATUTE OF THE FOREIGN TRADE
ARBITRATION COMMISSION, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1035 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as STATUTE].
127 Kotlarchuk, Has the USSR Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission Reached the Age of Aquarius
with its Newly Revised Arbitration Statute of 1975?, 11 INT'L LAw. 467 (1977).
128 STATUTE, supra note 126, art. 1.
129 Lebedev, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the
USSR. Chamber of Commerce and Indust, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275 (1977).
130 The Chamber of Commerce and Industry, by virtue of its Charter, is "[a] non-govern-
mental organization contributing to the development and promotion of trade and economic
relations of the U.S.S.R. with other countries." Id at 275-76.
131 U.S.S.R. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, RULES OF PROCEDURE IN THE
FOREIGN TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION (1975), reprinted in 1 INT'L COM. ARB. (Oceana)
pt. III, 99 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RULES OF PROCEDURE].
132 According to the Rules of Procedure, the list of FTAC arbitrators shall include not less
than fifteen persons. RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 4. There is no restriction as to
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tially, each party is allowed to select an arbitrator 34 or to solicit the
President of the Commission to make the appointment for them. If the
defendant does not choose an arbitrator within thirty days after receipt
of notification by the Commission of a claim against him, the President
of the Commission shall appoint the arbitrator for the defendant. 135 The
two arbitrators thus chosen or appointed elect the third arbitrator, who
serves as chairman of the tribunal. 136 If the two arbitrators do not agree
within ten days on the selection of a third, the Chairman is appointed by
the President of the FTAC. 137 Costs of the arbitration are paid by the
parties involved, through fees paid to the Commission. 1 3
The jurisdiction 139 of the Soviet FTAC exists in two general con-
texts. First, valid agreement by the parties involved to have any dispute
arbitrated will establish the jurisdiction of the FTAC. 140  Second, the
new statute of the FTAC also recognizes the participation of the Soviet
Union in several international treaties which mandate settlement by ar-
bitration of disputes between signatory parties. 14 1 Where arbitration is
compelled by such treaties, the jurisdiction of the FTAC may exist if, for
instance, it is generally provided that the defendant's arbitral procedures
will be invoked, and the Soviet party is the defendant. Once established,
jurisdiction is exclusive of any judicial proceeding.
The question of the competence of the FTAC in a particular pro-
ceeding is resolved by the tribunal hearing the case. 14 2 Thus, where one
of the parties challenges the jurisdiction of the Commission, such a chal-
lenge does not abate the FTAC proceeding. Rather, the arbitrators
themselves resolve any jurisdictional objection. If jurisdiction is found,
they then proceed with the hearing."43
Arbitration proceedings are instituted by filing a statement of claim
with the FTAC. This statement identifies all parties, the plaintiff's de-
mands and amount of claim, the legal and evidentiary bases of the claim,
a statement of jurisdiction of the FTAC, the name of the plaintiff's pro-
nationality, although the practice thus far has been to list only arbitrators who are Soviet citi-
zens. Holtzmann, Dispute Resoluton Procedures in East-West Trade, 13 INr'L LAw. 233, 235 (1979).
133 Kotlarchuk, supra note 127, at 474.
134 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, §§ 14.2(e), 17.3.
'35 Id § 18.2.
136 Id § 18.1.
137 Id § 18.2; Lebedev, supra note 129, at 279.
138 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 11.
139 See generally id § 1.
140 Kotlarchuk, supra note 127, at 473.
141 Under article 2, the Commission "shall also entertain disputes which the parties in-
volved are bound to refer thereto by virtue of international treaties." An example of such a
treaty is the Moscow Convention of 1972, which relates to practically all fields of economic,
scientific and technical cooperation among member countries. It provides, as a general rule, for
the submission of disputes to the institutional arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce in the
respondent's country. Lebedev, supra note 129, at 283.
142 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 1.3.
143 Lebedev, supra note 129, at 283-84.
ARBITRAL FORUMS 233
posed arbitrator and proof of payment of the arbitration fee. 144 The re-
quirement of presenting all written evidence simultaneously with the
complaint saves the foreign party the inconvenience of discovery. In
fact, no provision is made for discovery in the Rules of Procedure.
4 5
The statement is received by the Secretary of the FTAC, who notifies the
respondent and invites him to file a written defense within thirty days.146
At the end of the thirty day period the Commissioner may appoint the
case for hearing, although this does not preclude the respondent from
submitting a defense at a later stage.'
4 7
The seat of the FTAC and the place of its meetings is in Moscow. If
necessary, a tribunal may hold a meeting elsewhere.' 48 Generally the
proceedings will be open to the public, although upon motion by the
tribunal or either party they will be closed. 149 Each side must prove the
facts which it is relying on in making its claim or defense.' 50 Addition-
ally, the arbitrators may collect evidence on their own initiative.' 5 1 Dur-
ing the course of the hearing the parties are allowed to question experts
and witnesses, as well as each other. In reaching their conclusion, the
arbitrators are free to evaluate the evidence "according to their own in-
ner convictions."'
152
According to the Rules of Procedure, the Commission resolves dis-
putes as to applicable law, "being guided-if the dispute has arisen from
contractual relations-by the provisions of the contract and having re-
gard to trade usages."' 53 The substantive law applicable to a particular
dispute may be determined in several possible ways. First, it is a com-
mon principle of Soviet law that provisions of an international conven-
tion override any conflicting Soviet law. 154 Second, the FTAC has
established a strong tradition of giving full recognition to choice of forum
clauses. ' 55 Finally, in the absence of agreement as to applicable law, the
conflicts rule of lex loci contractus will be referred to.' 56 In such cases "the
place of the making of a transaction shall be determined according to
Soviet law."'
157
By virtue of article 9 of the Statute, awards of the FTAC are final
and without appeal. Awards are to be settled by the parties voluntarily,
144 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 14.
145 Comment, The Case for FTAC Arbitration of Disputes between Soviet Enterprises and American
Firns, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 302, 325 (1975).
146 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 17.2.
147 Lebedev, supra note 129, at 287.
148 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 6.
149 Id § 23.
150 Id § 27.
151 Lebedev, supra note 129, at 288.
152 RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 131, § 27.4.
153 Id § 12.
154 Lebedev, supra note 129, at 289.
155 Comment, supra note 145, at 330.
156 Id at 332.
157 Lebedev, supra note 129, at 290.
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within the period set by the Commission. If an award is not voluntarily
executed within this period, it is enforced according to law and interna-
tional treaties. 158 The Soviet Union has entered into bilateral treaties
providing for mutual recognition of arbitral awards with more than
twenty countries, and is also a party to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June
10, 1958.159
Since its inception in 1932, a primary criticism of the FTAC has
been its attachment to the USSR Chamber of Commerce. 160 Despite
concern as to the FTAC's impartiality, it is generally recognized that it
has a nearly unblemished record for fairness. 16 1 There has even been
some suggestion that the FTAC has been more than fair in order to foster
confidence abroad. 162 Although the pre-eminence of the FTAC has re-
cently been declining as Soviet enterprises have begun to agree to other
forums and choices of law, the FTAC does remain a viable alternative for
several reasons.
Initially, the dangers of failing to provide for any arbitration in a
U.S.-Soviet contract should be considered. 163 Perhaps that is a risk an
investor may choose to take, hoping that any dispute will be settled
before the need for arbitration arises. But if settlement does not occur,
the U.S. party will either have to create an ad hoc arbitral proceeding or
find itself involved in a lawsuit governed by local Soviet law. Such litiga-
tion would be expensive and bothersome, and the inexperience of domes-
tic courts in resolving trade disputes makes the inclusion of an arbitral
agreement much more sensible.' 64
There remains the possibility of providing for arbitration in a third
party forum, such as Sweden or Switzerland. This would allay fears of
unfairness, but creates several problems in the process. Under the con-
flict of laws principles most likely in force in the forum, and absent a
choice of law clause, Soviet substantive law would most likely be deemed
applicable. There is, therefore, little reason to avoid the FTAC, which is
at least more familiar with Soviet law.16 5 If it is agreed that the law of a
third party forum will apply, the proceedings become even more compli-
cated and the results more difficult to predict. Finally, third party tribu-
158 Id at 291.
159 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
160 See, e.g., Pisar, The Communist System of Foreign- Trade Adjudtation, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1509,
1426 (1959).
161 Comment, supra note 145, at 355.
162 S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 408 (1970). Pisar has stated: "Those nomi-
nated by the various communist Chambers of Commerce to serve as arbitrators are in general
persons of considerable achievement and high professional and social standing. One cannot
lightly assume that such individuals are devoid of intuitive feelings for justice and foul
play. . . . To foster contractual discipline at home and confidence abroad, the tribunals may
indeed be leaning backward to be harsh with their own." Id at 408-09.
163 Comment, supra note 145, at 353.
164 Id at 354.
165 Id
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nals have had little experience in resolving disputes between socialist and
capitalist countries, and their rules of procedure may be inadequate for
the task. 166 On balance, given its strong record of fairness in its over
forty years of existence and its general autonomy from the Soviet state
system, there is no reason to avoid the FTAC for ideological reasons. In
addition, since Soviet domestic law may well govern the arbitration pro-
ceeding regardless of its situs, the thorough knowledge of Soviet law and
East-West economic relation of FTAC arbitrators may well be a desired
plus. 167
V. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC Institute), officially organized in 1949, evolved from a committee
for settling commercial disputes that the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce had created in 1917.168 Although previously involved primarily
with domestic disputes, in 1976 the SCC Institute revised its rules to ac-
commodate non-Swedish parties seeking arbitration of international dis-
putes.169 For a variety of reasons, the SCC Institute has emerged since
1976 as a major international arbitration institute. 170
Sweden's popularity as a place for arbitration is grounded on the
difficulties inherent in choosing an arbitral forum when the disputants
are of different nationalities. 17 1 Rather than arbitrate in either of the
parties' home states, the parties can more easily agree to arbitration in a
third country. 172 Such third country arbitration presumably ensures a
more objective result.
Sweden qualifies as a desirable third country arbitration location for
two reasons. First, the cornerstone of Sweden's foreign policy is
nonalignment with either the East or West, or the developed or develop-
ing countries.173 Second, Sweden is particularly familiar with and exper-
ienced in the arbitration process, having adopted the first Swedish
Arbitration Act as early as 1887.174
Recognizing these advantages of the SCC Institute, the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of the U.S.S.R. and the American Arbitration
Association drafted a model arbitration clause for optional use in U.S.-
Soviet trade, providing for arbitration in Sweden under the UNCITRAL
166 Id
167 Id at 356.
168 Hjerner, Sweden: the Stockholm Arbitration Institute, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL AR-
BITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 189 (1977).
169 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 231.
170 Wetter, East Meets West in Sweden, 13 INT'L LAW. 261 (1979).
171 See McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 Ir'r'L LAW. 211 (1979);
Holtzmann, Dispute Resolution Procedures in East-West Trade, 13 INT'L LAW. 233 (1979).
172 Holtzmann, supra note 171, at 235.
173 The Swedish character is one of "a cool dispassionate attitude to the resolution of inter-
national disputes." Wetter, supra note 170, at 264.
174 Holtzmann, supra note 171, at 240-41.
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Rules, 175 with the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 176 having author-
ity to appoint the presiding arbitrator. 177 In their joint announcement of
the model clause in 1977, the parties explained that the clause "is op-
tional and that parties from both countries are free to utilize the clause,
or such other form of arbitration as they may mutually prefer and agree
best suits their particular needs."' 17 8 In view of Eastern Europe's and the
Soviet Union's decided preference for the arbitration method of resolu-
tion of contract disputes, 1 79 the existence of such a model clause is likely
to further enhance the SCC Institute's position as a major international
arbitration institute. 180
The SCC Institute Rules state that the Swedish law of arbitration
applies to procedure. Consequently, the Institute's rules of procedure
closely resemble those in the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1929.181 Swed-
ish law, however, permits the parties to choose the specific set of arbitra-
tion procedures they wish to utilize in connection with the SCC
Institute. 8 2 Thus a choice by the parties of the UNCITRAL procedural
rules would not disrupt a concomitant choice of the SCC Institute as the
administering body. '
83
Under the SCC Institute's 1976 Rules, the Institute appoints the
chairman of the arbitral tribunal, or the sole arbitrator if the single arbi-
trator method is chosen, without participation by the parties. 18 4 Nor-
mally there will be three arbitrators, with each party appointing one.' 8 5
In the event a party fails to appoint an arbitrator, the Institute is empow-
ered to appoint that member of the tribunal. 8 6 Whether appointed by
the Institute or by the parties, arbitrators are subject to challenge for
cause before the Institute.
8 7
The Swedish law of arbitration does not mandate a specific proce-
dure. The arbitrators are given great discretion to determine how the
proceedings should be conducted.' 88 The rules do require that the par-
175 See UNCITRAL discussion in text at notes 247-77 infra.
176 When the appointment is to be made by the Chamber of Commerce itself rather than
the SCC Institute, the "appointment will be made in consultation with the SCC Institute, and
therefore in practice the result is likely to be the same as if reference had been made to the
Institute." Hjerner, supra note 168, at 190.
177 For text of the clause, see 3 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 463-70.
178 Holtzmann, supra note 171, at 245.
179 Id at 234-35.
180 The influence of this model clause may be even greater. "The Chinese have told us that
they are carefully studying Swedish arbitration law and practice. A delegation from the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade has visited the arbitration facilities at the
Stockholm Chamber, and the director of the Stockholm Chamber has visited Peking for pur-
poses of discussion on arbitration." Id at 244.
181 Hjerner, supra note 168, at 190.
182 Holtzmann, supra note 171, at 242.
183 See UNCITRAL discussion at notes 247-77 infra; 4 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 30.
184 McLaughlin, supra note 171, at 230.
185 Hjerner, supra note 168, at 191.
186 Id at 189.
187 Id at 194; see 4 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 23-40.
188 McLaughlin, supra note 171, at 229.
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ties submit to the arbitrators in writing a statement of the issues as well
as a summary of the evidence to be offered by each party. 189 Although
the arbitrators are granted the power to appoint experts on their own
initiative, they are not empowered to require a witness' testimony or to
require production of evidence by the parties. 190 Under the 1976 Rules,
the arbitrator's decision must be accompanied by a statement of the rea-
sons underlying the award. 19 1 The award is generally not made pub-
lic. 192
As regards the costs of SCC arbitration, the basic rule of Swedish
law is that "the losing party shall pay the winning party all costs which
are reasonably necessary for the conduct of the latter's case, inclusive of
fees and costs to the arbitrators and costs for the party's attorney and
even for the party's own work on the case."' 193  The lack of either an
arbitrator's fee schedule or a more definite explanation of cost determi-
nation in the Rules has made estimates of the ultimate cost of SCC arbi-
tration uncertain. 194 The arbitrators are also permitted to apportion the
expenses of arbitration among the parties. 1
95
VI. International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States 196 entered into force on October 14,
1966,197 one month after the twentieth country had deposited its instru-
ment of ratification.1 98 The Convention provides for conciliation and
arbitration proceedings to be administered by the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international in-
stitution associated with the World Bank and based in Washington, D.C.
ICSID is governed by an Administrative Council composed of one repre-
sentative from each member country to the Convention. The Adminis-
trative Council adopts the procedural rules which govern proceedings
189 Id
190 Id
191 Hjerner, supra note 168, at 199.
192 Id at 199-200.
'93 Id at 200.
194 McLaughlin, supra note 171, at 229; 2 J. WETTER, supra note 9, at 232.
195 Id For a more in depth treatment of the SCC Institute's procedures, the reader is re-
ferred to Dr. Gillis Wetter's book, Arbitraton in Sweden, published in English by the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, which has been noted as containing authoritative commentary on
Swedish arbitration law and practice and translations of the relevant statutes. Copies of this
book are available in the United States through the American Arbitration Association.
196 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
The Convention was the result of efforts initiated by the World Bank to improve the climate of
international investment. The World Bank realized that the creation of a mechanism for con-
ciliation or arbitration wherein the host state and the investor were on equal terms would en-
courage investment. Intervention by the investor's home state was to be forbidden.
197 Amerasinghe, The International Centerfor the Settlement of Investment Disputes and Development
through the Mulinattonal Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 793 (1976).
198 Broches, The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dzsputes, in HANDBOOK OF
INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1977).
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unless the parties involved agree otherwise.' 99
ICSID itself does not conciliate or arbitrate. Those proceedings are
conducted by conciliators or arbitrators appointed in accordance with
the provisions of the Convention, or by the parties in their discretion.
The discretion given the parties to determine the nature and rules of
their own proceedings and to choose the arbitrators has been considered
one of the strengths of the Convention. 200 Indeed, the Convention was
carefully drawn so as to encourage participation in ICSID by both host
nations and private parties.
The Convention contains rules for the resolution of disputes by ei-
ther conciliation 20 1 or arbitration. 20 2 Conciliation, though not binding
on the parties, offers greater flexibility than does arbitration. 20 3 The par-
ties are free to determine by mutual agreement almost all of the procedu-
ral questions 20 4 and may even agree that conciliation will be binding. 20 5
Should the parties fail to agree on a procedural point, the Convention
includes mechanisms for resolving any impasse. Consent to conciliation,
once given, is irrevocable. 20 6 As a result, a conciliation proceeding prop-
erly begun will result in a determination regardless of the conduct or
withdrawal of either of the parties.20 7
From the perspective of the host nation, resolution of a dispute by
ICSID offers several advantages. 20 8 First, a host state that agrees to sub-
mit a controversy to ICSID is guaranteed that the investor's national
state may not afford him diplomatic protection or bring an international
claim on his behalf.20 9 Second, a host state may require that local reme-
dies be exhausted before consenting to the jurisdiction of the Center. 210
Third, absent agreement to the contrary, the applicable law in an arbi-
tration is that of the host state. 2 1' Fourth, procedural rules are flexible in
order to avoid compromising the traditionally special status of states in-
volved in litigation with private persons. 21 2 Fifth, the host state is as-
199 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 799.
200 Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Naionals ofother States, 1 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 9 (1968).
201 Convention, supra note 196, arts. 28-35.
202 Id., arts. 36-55.
203 Id art. 34. Parties to a conciliation proceeding must "give their most serious considera-
tion to the Conciliation Commission's recommendations." Amerasinghe, Dispute Settlement Ma-
chinery in Relations between States and Multinational Enterprises-with Particular Reference to the
International Center for the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, I I INT'L LAW. 45, 57 (1977).
204 Parties cannot by agreement alter certain unwaivable requirements regarding the com-
position of the Commission, (arts. 29(2)(a), 31(2), 56(1) and (3), nor can the financial obligations
of the parties to the Center be dispensed with by an agreement inter se. Convention, supra note
196, arts. 3, 29(2)(a), 31(2), 56(1).
205 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 798.
206 Id at 800.
207 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 57.
208 Id. at 47.
209 Convention, supra note 196, art. 27.
210 Id art. 26.
211 Id. art. 42.
212 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 802.
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sured that any monetary award will be executed by the court of any
member state as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state.213
Finally, the ability of participating states to attract foreign investment is
increased by the existence of an independent dispute resolution body not
subject to unilateral changes of law by any individual forum.2 14
The Convention also offers several advantages to the private inves-
tor. Most significantly, the Convention provides persons and corpora-
tions the only institutionalized international forum for litigating with
states. In addition to foreign states being subject to the jurisdiction of the
Center, state organs and constituent subdivisions of the host state are also
so subject, a significant enlargement of the class of potential parties.
Both parties to a dispute brought before ICSID also benefit from the fact
that the Convention is structured so as to insure that any proceeding
properly instituted will actually be pursued, and will in due course result
in a ruling, despite the failure of one of the parties to participate.2 1 5 The
Convention has specific provisions which provide a back-up system
should the parties fail to agree on such things as the identity of the
mediators2 16 or the procedural rules the tribunal is to follow.2 1 7 Under
article 42(2) the arbitral body cannot make a finding of non l'quel on the
ground of silence or obscurity of the law.
2 18
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Center is widely drawn, the
only significant requirements being that a dispute, to be within the
Center's jurisdiction, must be a dispute as to a legal right or obligation 2 '9
and must arise out of an investment. 22 0 Neither term is defined in the
Convention. It is possible that the Center may be used as a fact-finding
body, provided the facts at issue will resolve a legal dispute.22 1 Disagree-
ments as to the legal obligations of the parties under either municipal or
transnational law are also within the jurisdiction of the Center, absent an
agreement to the contrary between the parties. 222 Finally, although ju-
risdiction of the Center is limited to legal disputes, specific provision is
made for settlements ex aequo et bono,2 2 3 and thus parties are not limited to
seeking solely legal remedies.
Personal jurisdiction of the Center exists only when one party to the
dispute is a contracting state or one of its constituent subdivisions or
agencies 224 and the other party is a national of another contracting
213 Convention, supra note 196, art. 54.
214 Arnerasinghe, supra note 203, at 47.
215 Id at 48.
216 Id
217 Convention, supra note 196, arts. 33, 34.
218 A finding of non lquet indicates that the case is not clear enough for the judges to pro-
nounce a verdict. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (5th ed. 1979).
219 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 49.
220 Convention, supra note 196, art. 25(1).
221 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 800; Convention, supra note 196, art. 25(1).
222 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 50-51.
223 Convention, supra note 196, art. 42(3).
224 Id art. 25(l).
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state.225 The parties must agree by written consent to the jurisdiction of
ICSID.226 This requirement is generally described as "the cornerstone of
the jurisdiction of the Centre.122 7 A request for arbitration or concilia-
tion is formally submitted to the Center by filing it with the Secretary-
General. 22 8 Importantly, there is no required form of consent. Consents
may be found in instruments of completely diverse character which are
not necessarily drawn to refer to the other party or to any dispute with
it. 2 2 9 The host state may, for example, express its consent through a leg-
islative act such as investment promotion legislation, while an investor's
consent may be found in general form in a corporate charter or resolu-
tion.230
Choice of law questions under the Convention are left, in the first
instance, to the parties involved in the arbitration. In the absence of any
agreement, the Convention offers a fall-back provision to resolve the
question.2 31 The parties may also decide the rules of law the tribunal
will apply. Absent agreement, the Convention provides that the law
shall be "the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including
its rules on conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable. '232
The creation of an arbitral body and the establishment of rules to
assure that arbitration will continue even upon the default of one of the
parties would be meaningless absent equally stringent enforcement pro-
visions. Under the Convention, an arbitral award is binding on the par-
ties and each party is required to abide by and comply with its terms.233
A party is excused from this obligation only if execution of the award has
been delayed pursuant to a request for interpretation, 234 revision, 23 5 or
annulment 236 of the award, as provided for in the Convention. 23 7 Either
225 Id art. 25; Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 800; Szasz, supra note 200, at 9.
226 Convention, supra note 196, art. 25(1).
227 Concurrent with their approval of the Convention, the Directors of the World Bank
adopted a report on the Convention, which is appended to the Convention in the official publi-
cations of the Bank and the Center. The report was designed to provide an explication of the
major provisions of the Convention, and was made available to all contracting state govern-
ments for their review prior to signing and ratifying the Convention. The report is published in
Doc. ICSID/2. Szasz, supra note 200, at 8.
228 Szasz, supra note 200, at 10.
229 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 54. The Center has drafted model consent to jurisdic-
tion clauses which are available for use in bilateral or multilateral agreements. Model Clauses
Relating to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes; Designed for Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Doc. ICSID/6.
230 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 54.
231 Id. This means that once consent has been given, partial or complete lack of agreement
cannot prevent the rendering of a decision.
232 Convention, supra note 196, art. 42(1).
233 Id art. 53(l).
234 Id. art. 50.
235 Id art. 51.
236 Id art. 52.
237 Id This article of the Convention makes these three remedies the exclusive ones avail-
able.
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party may make such requests. A request for interpetation is simply an
inquiry addressed to the tribunal which made the award for an explana-
tion of its scope or meaning. If the tribunal is unavailable, the request is
directed to a new tribunal created pursuant to the general Convention
rules. 2
38
A request for revision is allowed "on the ground of discovery of some
fact of such a nature as decisively to affect the award. '23 9 The fact may
have been unknown to the tribunal and the applicant, although the ap-
plicant must not have been negligent in failing to discover the fact. 240
Application must be made within ninety days after discovery, subject to
an absolute three year statute of limitations running from the time the
award is rendered. Again, application is made to the tribunal which ren-
dered the award. Where that tribunal is unavailable, a new one is ap-
pointed consistent with the provisions of the Convention.24 '
The most extreme challenge to an award is a request for annulment,
which can be based on one or more of the following grounds: (a) the
tribunal was not properly constituted, (b) the tribunal clearly exceeded
its powers, (c) there was corruption by one of the members of the tribu-
nal, (d) the tribunal made serious departures from the fundamental rules
of procedure and (e) the award failed to state the reasons on which it was
based. 242 The request for annulment is not submitted to the original
tribunal, but rather to an ad hoc three-member committee appointed by
the Chairman of the Administrative Council from the Panel of Arbitra-
tors. This committee may annul the award in whole or part.243
Barring any attempt by either party to delay the enforcement of the
award, article 53 establishes the binding force of an award on the inter-
national law level. 244 In addition, article 54 provides for enforcement by
municipal courts. Each state which is a party to the Convention is re-
quired to recognize an award as if it were a final judgment of the court of
that state, even if the state was not a party to the dispute. 245 In effect,
the award is res judicata in every contracting state. Each state's courts
must therefore enforce the pecuniary obligations created by an award if
the prevailing party brings the award to that state for execution. 246
However, article 55 explicitly provides that such an award is not entitled
to enforcement by any means which is inconsistent with local law. For
instance, if domestic judgments would not be entitled to forced execu-
238 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 55.
239 Convention, supra note 196, art. 51.
240 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 55.
241 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 813.
242 Amerasinghe, supra note 203, at 55.
243 Id. at 56.
244 Amerasinghe, supra note 197, at 816.
245 All that is required is presentation of a copy of the award, certified by the Secretary-
General of the Center.
246 Broches, supra note 198, at 13.
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tion, judgments rendered through the Center would not be either. This
is an important recognition of state sovereignty.
The temptation in measuring the effectiveness of ICSID is to con-
sider the number of cases submitted as a suitable yardstick. Such a meas-
ure would not fully reflect the value of the Convention for two reasons.
First, it is quite possible that many disputes are avoided or resolved by
the mere presence of clearly established rules applicable to commercial
disagreements. Second, and more important, there is no question that
the existence of ICSID serves to improve the general climate of interna-
tional investment, just as the drafters of the Convention at the World
Bank intended.
VII. UNCITRAL
When parties contract to arbitrate their potential differences, it is
often advisable to specify in advance the procedural rules to be used in
the arbitration proceedings. 247 Whether detailed in the contract or in-
corporated by reference, a variety of different sets of rules can be chosen.
Complete procedural rules for arbitration have been established by
many trade associations for general use within the industry, by the vari-
ous institutional arbitration tribunals, and by statutes of some states.248
There are significant variations between the various sets of rules.
249
These variations have become more significant as the increasing popular-
ity of arbitration has caused the number of differing procedural rules to
proliferate 250 because the parties' and arbitrators' familiarity with the
rules contributes to the efficiency of a proceeding.2 5 1 In an effort to pro-
vide uniform rules for conducting arbitration proceedings, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has de-
veloped a comprehensive set of arbitration rules intended to be univer-
sally acceptable.2 52 The UNCITRAL Rules 253 were adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 15, 1976.254
The UNCITRAL Rules can apply to both ad hoc and institutional
arbitration if the parties to the contract have so agreed.25 5 However ap-
plication of the UNCITRAL Rules to an existing arbitral institution has
been attacked by the better known arbitral institutions, which possess
247 Ehrenhaft, supra note 56, at 1205.
248 Thompson, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 142-43 (1976).
249 Ehrenhaft, supra note 56, at 1205.
250 McClelland, supra note 4, at 737.
251 Thompson, supra note 248, at 142.
252 Id. at 143.
253 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, ARBITRATION RULES (1976) reprinhtedin 15 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 701 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL RULES].
254 UNCITRAL adopted its arbitration rules on April 28, 1976. UNCITRAL Report, 31
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no.. 17) 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
255 McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 228. Existing arbitral bodies are referred to in the Rules
as "appointing authorities." UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 253, art. 1(1).
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their own sets of familiar rules which they are understandably reluctant
to set aside. Such arbitral institutions perceive that if they use the UN-
CITRAL Rules, they will lose an appreciable degree of control over the
arbitral proceedings. 256 Thus, an arbitral institution chosen by the par-
ties can decline to administer the proceedings even though the parties
have also agreed that the UNCITRAL Rules would control. 257
It is also important to note that the UNCITRAL Rules can be mod-
ified by the parties incorporating them into the contract, 258 so that the
parties retain ultimate control over their initial ad hoc arbitration agree-
ment.
259
The UNCITRAL Rules are divided into three basic sections: com-
position of the arbitral tribunal (articles 5-14); arbitral proceedings (arti-
cles 15-30); and, the award (articles 31-41). Under the Rules, the arbitral
tribunal will consist of three arbitrators unless the parties agree within
fifteen days of the notice of arbitration that there will be a sole arbitra-
tor.2 6 0 If the parties are unable to agree upon the sole arbitrator's iden-
tity and no existing arbitral body has been chosen by the parties to
administer the arbitration procedure, the Secretary-General of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is permitted to designate an
"appointing authority" who will subsequently name the arbitrator. 26 If
three arbitrators are to be appointed, the standard party-arbitration sys-
tem, whereby each party appoints an arbitrator and those two arbitra-
tors choose the third,262 is mandated. 263 If the two arbitrators are unable
to agree on the third, the appointing authority method described above
is utilized. 264
Arbitrators named under the Rules are required to disclose "any
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to [their] imparti-
ality or independence. '265 A party may challenge a prospective arbitra-
tor under article 10 of the UNCITRAL Rules. The efficacy of the
challenge is determined by the decision of the appointing authority pre-
viously designated by either the parties or the Secretary-General. 266
256 Thompson, supra note 245, at 145.
257 But submissions declined by one institution will be accepted elsewhere, and the well-
known institutions do not wish to be put in the position of either administering arbitration
under rules other than their own or losing business. The smaller arbitral institutions, on the
other hand, stand to benefit handsomely if they can advertise their services under a world-wide
set of procedural rules. Id.
258 UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 253, art. 1(2).
259 Thompson, supra note 248, at 143-44.
260 UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 253, art. 5.
261 Id. art. 6(2). The Secretary-General is required to use a "list-procedure" to determine
the parties' preferences for the appointing authority. McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 228-29.
262 Thompson, supra note 248, at 147.
263 UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 253, art. 7(1).
264 Id. art. 7(3).
265 Id art. 9.
266 Id art. 12.
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The rules of procedure in the UNCITRAL arbitral proceedings are
flexible, as illustrated by article 15(1): "[Tjhe arbitral tribunal may con-
duct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided
that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting its case."
However, each party has the right to require a hearing for the presenta-
tion of evidence by witnesses and for oral argument. 26 7
The tribunal also has the power to appoint experts to report to it on
specific issues26a and to require the parties to produce documents or
other evidence. 269 Parties have the right to inspect the documents on
which the tribunal's expert based his opinion 2 70 and to present their own
expert witnesses. 27 1
Pursuant to articles 18 and 19, the parties are allowed to frame the
issues for the tribunal by submitting written statements of claim and de-
fense. Submission of further written statements, however, is discretion-
ary with the tribunal. 272
Under the UNCITRAL Rules, any decision or award requires
agreement of a majority of the arbitrators. 273 The award must be in
writing and the reasons upon which the award is based must also be
stated.2 74 The award will be made public only with the consent of both
parties.275
With regard to the costs of arbitration, article 39 states that "[t]he
fees of the arbitral tribunal shall be reasonable in amount, taking into
account the amount in dispute, the complexity of the subject matter, the
time spent by the arbitrators and any other relevant circumstances of the
case." Such costs will generally be specified in the award.2 76 Additional
costs, such as travel expenses of witnesses, arbitrators and experts, legal
expenses of the successful party, fees of the appointing authority and Sec-
retary-General, may also be included in the award.2 77 Although in most
cases the costs of arbitration are to be assigned to the unsuccessful party,
267 Id art. 15(2). This section also provides: "In the absence of such a request, the arbitral
tribunal shall decide whether to hold such hearings or whether the proceedings shall be con-
ducted on the basis of documents or other materials." Id
268 Id art. 27(1).
269 Id art. 24(3).
270 Id art. 27(3).
271 Id art. 27(4).
272 Id art. 22.
273 Id art. 31(1).
274 Id art. 32(2), (3).
275 Id. art. 32(5).
276 Id art. 38.
277 Id
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article 40 allows the tribunal to apportion the cost between the parties if
such action is reasonable in the particular situation.
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